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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
1:45 p.m. – 
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Chair: Dr. Fred Thompson, Professor, Atkinson Graduate School of Management, 
Willamette University 
Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts 
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Pablo T. Spiller, University of California, Berkeley 
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Peter Coughlan, Naval Postgraduate School 
Fred Thompson—Dr. Thompson is the Grace and Elmer Goudy Professor of Public Management 
and Policy Analysis at the Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University. Dr. 
Thompson is a specialist in the field of tax policy and regulation. 
Dr. Thompson is co-editor of the Handbook of Public Finance. He was the founding editor of the 
International Public Management Journal and is currently associate editor of the Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis. He has been published in numerous scholarly journals, including the 
American Political Science Review, Public Administration Review, Public Choice, and Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 
In 2000 Dr. Thompson received the Distinguished Research Award of the National Association of 
Schools of Public Affairs and Administration and the American Society for Public Administration. In 
2005 he received the Aaron B. Wildavsky Award for Outstanding Lifetime Scholarly Achievement in 
the field of public budgeting and financial management of the Association for Budgeting and Financial 
Management. In 2006 he served on the United Nations Development Program’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Macedonia. 
Dr. Thompson earned his Bachelor of Arts in economics and history from Pomona College and 
his PhD from the Center for Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University.
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Business Models for Cost Sharing and Capability 
Sustainment 
Michael Pryce—Pryce is a research fellow at Manchester Business School in the UK. His current 
project, presented in this paper, follows on from his prior work for the Acquisition Research Program, 
Costing Complex Products, Operations and Support (MBS-CE-11-196), which looked at innovative 
methods of costing future defense equipment. He was previously part of the 10-university NECTISE 
(Network Enabled Capability Through Innovative Systems Engineering) research team, exploring 
organizational aspects of Through Life Systems Management. [Michael.Pryce@mbs.ac.uk] 
Abstract 
Cost sharing in defense acquisition, with contractors sharing part of the burden of research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs, has been suggested as a way of reducing 
the liability of governments to program cost overruns. While capping the costs of RDT&E and 
production is an excellent objective, incentivizing contractors may benefit from business 
models that span the entire lifecycle of a program. The potential to share the risk of cost 
overruns outside of RDT&E and production, and into the operations and support (O&S) area, 
provides a powerful incentive to get contractors to “buy in” to cost sharing, and to control total 
program lifecycle costs. 
The research presented in this paper aims to develop new business models that allow 
contractors to benefit from cost sharing across all stages of program lifecycles, with a view to 
limiting costs during RDT&E, production, and O&S. Experience from the United Kingdom on 
availability contracting shows possible business models that could form the basis of an 
approach to cost sharing in O&S, as well as the weaknesses of some approaches tried.  
A set of case studies form the basis for the findings of the research. These use the concept of 
complexity and interactions as outlined in prior research (Pryce, 2011), and relate this 
complexity to the way that current business models and contracts for development, 
production, and support have been structured. It also looks at how the business models and 
contracts might have been written if a long-term approach, across the lifecycle, had been 
taken into account. 
The results of the case studies will provide a matrix of findings for the research, from which a 
set of ideal business models will be derived. These ideal business models will then be 
reviewed in light of the experiences of commercial organizations engaged in similar 
programs. In this paper initial, empirical business models are described as a basis for 
discussion, ahead of the final report of the research. 
Introduction 
The objective of the research that this paper stems from is to develop new business 
models that allow contractors to benefit from cost sharing across all stages of program 
lifecycles, with a view to limiting costs during research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E), production, and operations and support (O&S). The sums involved can be very 
substantial—for example, in the latest estimates for the Joint Strike Fighter around 40% of 
the program costs (c. $1–$1.45 trillion) are accounted for by RDT&E and production, with 
the remaining 60% are accounted for by O&S. 
However, the opportunities for controlling costs may vary between the stages of a 
program. Prior research (Pryce, 2011) indicates that RDT&E and production costs may be 
largely “locked in” once the degree of technical complexity of a program is decided upon. 
This usually occurs at a very early conceptual design stage in the program. However, the 
same research has illustrated that there appears to be much greater cost variance, and, 
therefore, active cost control, in the O&S phase.  
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By seeking business models that tie together all stages of program lifecycles, it is the 
objective of the research to enable true cost sharing to occur in defense acquisition, 
lowering the liability of governments to cost overruns, while ensuring contractors are 
incentivized and enabled to participate in cost sharing. They would then be able to spread 
their own risks over a full program lifecycle, in a way common to many commercial 
organizations engaged in the production and support of complex systems (Davies & 
Hobday, 2005). 
Background 
The complex technical and commercial risks involved in the development of new 
combat capabilities have been a recurring source of cost overruns in programs, stretching 
back many decades. While progress has been made in understanding the root causes of 
some historical failures and successes in a number of programs, the continued evolution of 
new technologies, the increasing lifespan of defense capabilities, and the ever-widening gap 
between new generations of capabilities have made it difficult to apply many of these 
lessons as widely as would be liked. 
Many lessons have been learned and applied to government acquisition processes 
(Edison & Murphy, 2011; Nowicki, Ramirez-Marquez, Randall, & Murynets, 2011; Wang & 
San Miguel, 2011). However, these can only have limited benefits without concomitant 
changes in contractor actions and behaviors in order to ensure overall program outcomes 
are those desired. This involves, on the one hand, more realistic cost estimating at the 
outset of programs, based on realistic estimates of the nature of the technical risk being 
undertaken in a program. However, estimates are not a method of controlling unexpected 
increases in risk and cost, only of reducing the extent of the variance of the possible outturn 
in program costs (Pryce, 2011). 
In order to enable better control of cost overruns, and to limit the government’s 
liability for these overruns, it has recently been proposed that cost sharing in RDT&E, and 
possibly also production, be pursued as a possible palliative (DiMascio, 2011). Cost sharing 
would see the government limit its liability to program costs at a percentage less than 100%, 
with figures of around 25% being quoted publicly for the associated liability of contractors. In 
such a cost sharing scenario, contractors are theoretically incentivized to minimize cost 
overruns by their liability for a share of the total program costs. 
While this can bring a welcome element of commercial practice to the development 
of new technologies, it is by no means an assured way of reducing risk. Indeed, it may 
simply serve to reduce the level of technical risk by reducing the advance in the level of 
warfighting capability being developed to one that is little more advanced than the current 
state of the art. In such a case, while costs may be less likely to overrun, and may be lower 
overall than a more advanced capability, the benefits of the lower risk solution may be 
sufficiently low to make it a poor choice in terms of cost/effectiveness when compared to an 
apparently more risky, but higher capability, system. 
The judgment of program costs, risks, and capabilities is a constant challenge in all 
high technology areas. However, it is not just defense that suffers from these difficulties. In 
major civil aerospace programs, similar issues also pertain. The recent lessons of how cost 
overruns in RDT&E can surprise even the most careful commercial organizations are shown 
by the case of the Boeing 787 and Airbus A380 airliners, where unexpected technical risks 
caused huge cost overruns in the order of billions of dollars (Norris & Wagner, 2009). 
However, the ability of commercial organizations to spread the impact of these risks over a 
full production, operations and support cycle, as well as utilizing financing mechanisms in 
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the commercial market, means that they are able to absorb such risks, and attendant cost 
overruns, in the development stages.  
It is the purpose of the research that this paper partly reports to outline how defense 
acquisition could use cost sharing across the lifecycle to enable capability sustainment in a 
way that benefits the government and contractors, using commercial practices and 
experience, while allowing technical advances to be made that warrant the costs incurred. In 
this paper, these aspects are illustrated by reporting on two of the case studies in the 
research in detail, the Harrier and Typhoon combat aircraft from the UK. 
Research Approach 
In order to allow cost sharing benefits to work for both the government and 
contractors, it is essential that the business models used for each program be tailored to 
meet the needs of both parties. In the UK the Ministry of Defence and several major 
contractors (such as BAE Systems and Rolls Royce) have spent many years moving 
towards the contractor provision of support for availability (Booth, 2011). This has been a 
difficult process, and one of the many lessons learned has been that a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach does not work. However, a number of successful availability support contracts 
have been created, and valuable experience has been gained from them.  
In the UK, the Harrier and Typhoon programs have been the source of business 
model innovation, as well as indicating some of their limits. In particular, it has been found 
that within each program a process of constant evolution is required, as new operational 
practices, technological advances, industrial re-organizations, and government policies have 
had a significant impact on the capability support enterprise. A number of other significant 
issues have been found to recur in the UK, and, over time, it has been seen that the 
business models need to be built to accommodate them.  
Most notable of these issues is the ability of the customer to terminate the use of a 
major system, or the development of a program, that can lead to the loss of most of the 
projected O&S revenue for the contractor over many decades. The most extreme examples 
of this have been shown in the recent (October 2010) Strategic Security and Defence 
Review (HMSO, 2010). This saw a radical reduction in the size and scope of the UK’s armed 
forces, and the cancelation of a number of programs. 
This included the removal of the UK’s Harrier STOVL aircraft fleet from Royal Air 
Force/Royal Navy service, and the downsizing of the RAF’s Tornado strike aircraft fleet, as 
well as changes to the planned UK acquisition of the STOVL F-35B aircraft in favor of the F-
35C carrier variant. Both Harrier and Tornado programs had been subject to contractor-led 
support contracts that had led to significant savings in O&S costs. However, the contracts 
had been let in such a way as to allow for modifications, cancelations, and reductions to the 
fleets, allowing procurement flexibility. 
In contrast, the UK decided to retain its commitment to Typhoon combat aircraft and 
the new CVF aircraft carriers. In both cases, these were still in the development and 
production phases, and the contracts for these phases were such that penalty charges for 
cancelation would have been more expensive than continuing with the programs.  
This meant that the desire to retain the development and production of these 
programs shaped UK defense policy, even though the government is on record as not 
actually wanting the new aircraft carriers, and of getting rid of the Harrier fleet with regret 
(HMSO, 2010). In order to save money in the short term, to meet financial limits imposed by 
the state of the national economy, long-term support contracts have had to be canceled to 
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produce savings, while the shorter term development and production contracts have been 
retained. 
This was brought about by the “traditional” approach to development and production 
contracts in the UK, with these being subject to tough negotiation, and then “set in stone,” in 
order to keep the contractor bound to meeting their strict terms. In contrast, as mentioned 
above, support contracts have been written in “softer” terms, to account for the changes that 
happen over time in O&S. On the Typhoon program, the desire to limit lifecycle costs has 
led to negotiation, with BAE Systems and the other European builders of the aircraft (EADS-
Cassidian and Alenia) for a 30% reduction in O&S costs, with a contract signed at the end of 
March 2012. 
However, this approach is less than ideal. In order for the government to meet short-
term savings, it finds itself committed to the annually more expensive, rigidly contracted, 
development and production of systems it does not want, while contractors may lose the 
larger total value of long-term support contracts in order to retain the short-term, and more 
risky, development and production contracts.  
In order to try to evolve a more sensible approach, where decisions can be made on 
a lifecycle basis, this paper aims to illustrate the issues that may inform the development of 
business models where risks and rewards can be spread over entire lifecycles, allowing 
decisions on programs to be made on the basis of their overall, long-term benefits and 
costs. 
The overarching research issue that lies behind this paper is this: What are the best 
business models for government and industry to benefit from cost sharing across program 
lifecycles? This is then intended to lead to a research result of identifying business models 
that can address this issue, depending on the type of program, timescales, and other 
factors. 
The research will answer these questions by looking at a number of case studies, 
from the perspective of programs, technologies and operational approaches, and by 
considering how UK experiences can be transitioned to the U.S. defense acquisition 
environment. 
The approach taken by the case studies for the research (Yin, 1994) is to look at 
each, using the concept of complexity and interactions as outlined in prior research (Pryce, 
2011), and to relate this complexity to the way that the business models and contracts for 
development, production, and support have been structured. It will also look at how they 
might have been written if a long-term approach, across the lifecycle, had been taken into 
account and if the complexity of this approach had been properly understood. 
The full set of case studies in the research include the following: 
 Programs 
o F-35 Lightning II (U.S./UK) 
o AV-8B/Harrier (U.S./UK) 
o Super Hornet (U.S.) 
o Typhoon (UK) 
 Technologies 
o Carbon fiber 
o Computing 
 Operational aspects 
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o Land-based combat aircraft 
o Sea-based combat aircraft 
In this paper, results for Harrier and Typhoon Programs are presented. The full 
report, due in June 2012, will provide findings for all cases and a full analysis and 
recommendations. 
The technologies cases explore how business models and contracts may have to 
change in light of possible changes in materials and computing technologies over time (the 
implications of such changes are indicated by Hullander and Walling, 2008, and Pryce, 
2011). The operational aspects cases, notably the impact of sea-based versus land-based 
operations of combat aircraft on the distribution of lifecycle costs, follows on from research 
comparing UK and U.S. carrier aviation using the UK “Lines of Development” approach 
(Pryce, 2009). 
As an initial step of the research, the literature on commercial business models was 
reviewed in order to identify issues that may be either common to, or different from, defense 
experiences, needs, and practices. 
Literature Review 
The need to sustain, extend, and modify defense equipment and organizational 
capabilities over a period of decades means that defense acquisition faces challenges that 
feature little in the existing academic literature on business models. There have been a 
number of definitions given for what a business model is, but in this paper the definition of 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) is accepted, namely that a business model is “is a 
reflection of the firm’s realized strategy” (p. 195). This is important, as it notes the difference 
between a business model and a strategy, and the importance of understanding the 
contingent nature of business models. 
Such contingencies derive from the circumstances within which the enterprise finds 
itself operating. The complex, long-term nature of defense equipment acquisition and use, 
as well as the need to constantly update technologies and skills in the light of emergent 
threats, lead to a situation where understanding the need and ability of organizations to 
respond to multiple, changing interactions (Pryce, 2011) is essential to creating a successful 
business model. 
Even the insertion of relatively simple technologies into existing systems can have 
profound implications for firms in the civil sector. Bjorkdahl (2009) notes that integrating new 
digital technology into existing mechanical products and their supporting processes can only 
work correctly if the firm carrying out the integration changes its entire business model. 
Changing the business model, for example by moving to licensing rather than selling of 
technology, rather than the overall strategy (e.g., to dominate a sector), is key to maximizing 
value for the user as well as the producer. This aspect of user-focused value enhancement 
also forms part of the understanding of what a business model is that underpins this paper. 
From these two works, we can arrive at the working definition of a business model 
used in this paper; namely, a business model is a way of jointly realizing value for producers 
and users in an interactive way that goes beyond a strategy and evolves, often rapidly, over 
time. 
This change over time in a commercial field may be a response to external economic 
and market events upsetting an equilibrium, driving business model innovation in order to 
lead to a period of growth (Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodriguez, & Velamuri, 2010). This growth is 
based on a new equilibrium established by the new business model, which, in effect, 
becomes a transition phase between strategies. This differs from the defense realm, where 
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change is constant and any equilibrium is short lived, especially in relation to the multi-
decades-long lifecycles of much defense equipment. 
Rather, in order to engage with defense issues, business models need to adapt in a 
continuous process in most cases, notably the major platforms and technologies featured in 
this research. Demil and Lecocq (2010) have identified the need for core parts of the 
evolving business model to enable a process of “dynamic consistency” in order to ensure 
that the competitive advantage of the firm still benefits from the process of evolution, as well 
as the needs of the user. This dynamic consistency is not in the form of a rigid set of 
relationships between the organizations, resources, or products that the business model is 
concerned with, but is seen, instead, in a consistent set of outputs. While for a firm this 
output is profitability, for the defense community it could be, for example, capability or 
availability. The business model, as seen by Demil and Lecocq (2010), delivers dynamic 
consistency by ensuring that profitability and capability evolve in mutually beneficial ways, 
while being less concerned with fixing a particular set of relationships to accomplish this 
outcome. 
The idea of a business model being concerned with mutual and diverse benefits to 
users and producers, as well as being subject to constant change over time, is one that sits 
well with the concept of interactions as being the key lens through which to view the costing 
of complex products, such as defense equipment (Pryce, 2011). While costing O&S is a 
difficult proposition, the concept of interactions offers a way of doing this that should also 
enable the development of business models that recognize the constant state of change 
brought about by such interactions. It should also illustrate their implications for the cost of 
O&S, as well as identifying areas of possible mutual benefit (e.g., where capability can be 
enhanced at little cost in comparison to other possible options). 
The following case studies identify approaches by UK industry and the UK armed 
forces that have already moved in this direction. 
Case Study 1: Harrier  
During the period 2005–2010, the UK’s Joint Force Harrier fleet of STOVL combat 
aircraft was updated both as part of a planned enhancement of capabilities and in response 
to their deployment in Afghanistan. There, a number of new needs were identified and the 
critical importance of a rapid response by industry was realised. Central to the technical 
solutions put forward by BAE Systems and their partner companies were a number of new 
capabilities of an advanced nature, implemented using simple tools (Lucas, 2008). This 
developed into a process known as Rapid Technology Insertion (RTI), which was 
implemented through the use of a team that was focussed around developing and 
implementing RTI. 
Central to this development was an approach on the part of industry that managed 
risk through the anticipation of user needs and partnering with the user to develop and 
deploy them. This was carried out within a dynamic contracting environment that saw 
increasing amounts of maintenance carried out by industry, both in support of RTI and for 
more routine work.  
The RTI process enabled Joint Force Harrier to exploit technologies as they become 
available and was an important feature in meeting the demands of the front-line squadrons 
where flexibility, responsiveness, timeliness, and military effectiveness were vital. 
Harrier RTI Business Model 
In order to meet the emergent needs from Afghanistan, the ongoing updates of the 
Harrier and additional needs from changes in UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) policy, BAE 
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System’s Harrier work was part of a network of stakeholders who formed partnering 
arrangements to carry out the Harrier upgrades. The RTI activities involved the coordination 
of all the other parties in the process of identifying requirements and solutions, gaining 
contracts, and implementing the solution. An important role in the RTI process was to 
ensure that the requirements that emerged from the Operational Evaluation Unit (OEU) 
were endorsed by the RTI team before being passed over to the MoD for approval. It had 
been seen that unendorsed requirements passed directly to the MoD had been the cause of 
problems in the past. For example, they led to a narrow Urgent Operational Requirement 
(UOR) being issued, where the RTI team may have been aware of additional issues around 
the identified requirement, and its potential solutions, that the OEU’s perspective did not 
allow it to see. 
This was seen as a vital part of the RTI team’s business model, anticipating 
customers’ future needs beyond their stated ones and, therefore, ensuring future business 
opportunities, as well as speeding up future upgrades as they emerged from customer 
experiences. This was enabled by customer representatives working as part of the RTI team 
and being willing to communicate up the customer hierarchy via the RTI team. This was 
greatly facilitated by key RTI team leaders being ex-Service personnel with direct knowledge 
and experience of front-line operations and of working on an OEU. 
The overall structure of the Harrier RTI business model is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Harrier/RTI Business Model 
Note. BAES—BAE System, MoD—UK Ministry of Defence, IPT—Integrated Project 
Team, RTI—Rapid Technology Insertion Team, OEU—Operational Evaluation Unit 
Partnering and Private Capital 
Central features of the anticipatory nature of the Harrier RTI team’s work was the use 
of partnering and private capital to both speed up the overall process of technology insertion 
and ensure that they were able to link with partner companies ahead of the issue of a 
specification or a contract from the MoD customer. 
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An example of this is the integration of the Lockheed Martin Sniper targeting pod 
(referred to as the Advanced Targeting Pod [ATP]). From September 2006–April 2007, the 
RTI program was funded by BAE Systems, with a contract from MoD only following in May 
2007. This required BAE Systems and MoD to partner closely with Lockheed Martin, who 
they were competing with in other programs, with the level of trust essential to enable this to 
happen. The ability to focus the business model around the RTI team, rather than at the 
level of BAE Systems, enabled this flexibility. The overall ATP program of events is shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Advanced Targeting Pod/RTI Timeline 
Note. The source for this figure is BAE Systems Rapid Engineering: Harrier UOR 
Experiences, an internal company document. 
BAE Systems’ private venture capital was also used to further develop the ATP 
solution and to give interim clearance advice to enable the OEU, 41(R) Squadron to conduct 
operational evaluation trials in fewer than four weeks from receipt of a Request for 
Quotation. 
Implications of the Business Model 
While the Harrier aircraft has many platform-specific issues, such as a relatively low 
level of systems integration and related cross-systems dependencies (in comparison to 
Typhoon, for example), which allowed quick development and implementation of new 
capabilities, this does not mean that the lessons from Harrier could not be applied more 
widely. In particular, the partnering approach allowed for by the use of the RTI model 
appears to be one that could be adopted widely. Even within BAE Systems, this was seen 
as being of great value and efforts were made to learn internally how the Typhoon aircraft 
could benefit from an RTI approach. 
Externally, the use of a small group, such as the RTI team, that is focused on 
anticipating customer needs, intimately involved in the development and implementation of 
requirements, and able to use their own funds to develop work in advance of contract issue, 
would seem to be of great value in defense acquisition and the sustainment of capabilities 
over a long time frame. 
In order to identify the key factors in the Harrier RTI success, a SWOT analysis was 
carried out. The results are shown in Table 1. 
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Small program—little political support 





CVF integration trials 
Threats 
Strategic decision to cancel Harrier 
MoD lose tacit understanding of Harrier 
IPT methods 
Strengths 
 Small team. The relatively small team on Harrier (c.600 BAES staff at all 
locations and in all disciplines), due in part to the fact that it was no longer in 
production, meant that decisions could be made quickly. All key senior personnel 
had desks located on one floor of a single building, with decisions able to be 
“walked around” quickly. 
 UK/BAE controlled. Unlike a number of other projects, Harrier was effectively a 
UK-only program. This made decision-making easier, as it did not require the 
agreement of partners in other countries. 
 RTI. This is a major factor in the success of the Harrier team and is the basis of 
their successful business model. 
Weaknesses 
 Small program—little political support. The fact that Harrier was a relatively small 
program meant that it was not the main “political” priority for anyone in industry or 
government. There was a constant need to prove the utility and effectiveness of 
the program, whereas on other programs (e.g., Typhoon) there was senior 
managerial and government support. In addition, as the Harrier was not in 
production, many fewer jobs depended on it. 
 BAE’s strategic management saw the “Harrier way” as quick and cheap, so 
lacking in a steady, high-volume cash flow. This lack of “political” support was 
mirrored in the lower scale of turnover and overall profits (but not profit rate) that 
Harrier delivered to BAE Systems, which meant that it was not seen as a “core” 
program for many managers in the company. 
Opportunities 
 JSF delay. The intended successor to the Harrier, the F-35B Lightning II Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF), is currently due to enter service at the end of the current 
decade. Even if it is procured by the UK as planned, the program is still at an 
early stage of flight testing and manufacturing, and it was thought that the RTI 
process would need to address these possible delays (before the Harrier’s UK 
cancellation in late 2010). 
 Combat use. The experience of Harrier in Afghanistan meant that the squadrons, 
maintenance organization, and industry had extensive current experience of 
working closely together to meet customer needs.  
 CVF integration trials. The intended replacement aircraft carriers for the Royal 
Navy, known as CVF, require integration with the aircraft intended to operate 
from them. The RTI team considered it possible to undertake trials of some 
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common equipment between Harrier and JSF in order to “de-risk” the latter, 
notably the Advanced Targeting Pod, which is a pod-mounted version of the 
internal targeting equipment to be fitted to JSF. 
Threats 
 Strategic decision to cancel Harrier. The UK’s decision to cancel Harrier was 
realized in late 2010, but had been anticipated as possible by the RTI team, who 
shaped their activities to reduce its likelihood, although to no avail. However, the 
Harrier team, much diminished, still supports the international Harrier fleet and 
the sale of UK Harriers to the U.S. 
 MoD loses its tacit understanding of Harrier IPT methods. The success of Harrier 
with its customer was the result of working closely with MoD, who enabled the 
work to happen in the way it did and supported it in large measure. But as the 
Harrier RTI team was central to this, their loss may mean the loss of customer 
knowledge of the business model and how to make it succeed. 
In order to see if the lessons of the Harrier RTI business model are applicable, work 
was carried out with contacts in BAE Systems working on Typhoon. The results are reported 
briefly in Case Study 2. 
Case Study 2: Eurofighter Typhoon  
The Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft program is a large-scale development, 
production, and support program for the UK MoD and BAE Systems. Features that 
differentiate it from the Harrier include the following: 
 A high level of systems integration and related cross-systems dependencies, 
 A four-nation international development and production partnership, and 
 Limited service use and operational experience in limited roles. 
In comparison to the relatively agile nature of Harrier RTI activities outlined above, 
Typhoon can seem rather less agile. For example, in interviews with Typhoon engineering 
personnel in BAE Systems, it was stated that a targeting pod integration similar to the 
Harrier’s ATP took seven years on Typhoon, as opposed to the timetable of less than one 
year for Harrier, as shown in Figure 2. 
These factors and characteristics mean that a Typhoon business model for 
sustainment may require different approaches from those of Harrier. However, the 
framework in which they can take place, namely a partnered support and update 
infrastructure, was in place on Typhoon in its early deployment, namely the very closely 
partnered “Case White,” which was Typhoon’s introduction to service. 
Case White was intended to support Typhoon’s move to its initial UK operational 
base at RAF Coningsby in July 2005 after a period of “working up” at BAE Systems’ Warton 
facility. It was intended to deliver the ability to deploy Typhoon overseas and on NATO 
commitments and, therefore, bridged the initial period in service with the UK Royal Air Force 
(RAF). 
BAE Systems was contracted for 1,300 flight hours from Warton, the training of 16 
pilots from the Operational Evaluation Unit and Operational Conversion Unit, and the further 
training of nearly 200 RAF engineering personnel. By operating initially from a BAE Systems 
facility, and by partnering with the MoD not just in training engineering personnel but also in 
provisioning of sustainment activities at RAF Coningsby, BAE Systems hoped to both ease 
Typhoon into service and to leverage the corporate engineering knowledge gained during 
development of Typhoon into the sustainment of the aircraft in service. 
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Case White itself is considered to have been successful. However, the “handover” of 
Typhoon to the RAF was not as smooth as would be hoped. In part this was due to the Case 
White engineering and management team at BAE Systems moving to support the purchase 
of Typhoons by Saudi Arabia. With the full introduction of Typhoon to RAF service, there 
was a subsequent reduction in partnering activities, although the RAF is still aiming to use 
BAE Systems as part of the overall sustainment activities. Recent contracts, such as the 
award of the £450 million Typhoon Availability Service (TAS) contract in March 2009 and the 
signing of a four-nation support agreement in March 2012, appear to be moving back 
towards a situation like that in Case White. Notably, the further integration of new 
capabilities in Typhoon is part of the new support contract and reduces support costs, which 
mirrors the purpose, if not the structures, of the Harrier RTI business model. 
The key differences between the Typhoon and Harrier experiences are shown in the 
SWOT analysis summary in Table 2. 
Table 2. SWOT Analysis of Typhoon 
Strengths 
Large program 
High turnover/long timescale 
Weaknesses 








Limited combat use 
Table 2 shows that Typhoon is in many ways the inverse of Harrier in terms of 
strengths and weaknesses. This could imply that a very different business model is required. 
In the final section, this issue will be discussed to illustrate how such apparent differences 
can mask potential synergies that can be harnessed in business models. 
Summary and Discussion 
The purpose of the research that this paper partly describes is to see if robust 
business models can be developed that improve the sustainment costs of defense 
programs, both for contractors and service users. 
In order to do this, it appears that a sustainable way of engaging contractors in O&S 
activities can offer a way to offset the expense of early development and may, in time, 
produce ways of shifting the burden of cost sharing away from development and production, 
instead focusing it across the lifecycle. 
The concept of the business model has been described as being focused on change 
and outcomes for both users and producers, rather than as a company adopting a strategy 
that it then implements in a linear fashion. A good business model is does not define the 
means, whether organizational structure, resources, or products, but, instead, enables the 
desired ends of sustainment activities for both contractors and government users. The fact 
that these ends are different for the two sides, and can change over time, is the area where 
a good business model reveals itself through its ability to deal with emergent needs and 
contingent circumstances in an agile manner. 
In the case studies it can be seen that the Harrier RTI exercise appears to have 
passed muster as a good business model, because it addressed the needs of the user 
community for new capabilities, developed and deployed rapidly, and allowed the company 
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to profit from these. In large part this success was due to the Harrier RTI team’s ability to 
anticipate future user needs, rather than just responding to them in piecemeal fashion. 
The Typhoon case by comparison shows that although the Case White exercise was 
successful, it was not sustained beyond its initial, narrow objectives. Additional sustainment 
partnering activities have had to start afresh, with a loss of the knowledge previously gained 
and through contracts with different partners. 
While these differences can be ascribed to the more complex technical nature of the 
aircraft, or the four-nation consortium that developed it, the fact that the business model of 
Case White could not overcome these limitations shows that it was not sufficiently robust for 
through life sustainment activities, although it functioned in its narrow remit for a period of 
time. 
It, therefore, seems that business model analysis should focus on systems that show 
the necessary robustness to deal with the changes inherent in the defense environment, 
with its myriad technical, organizational, and operational interactions. How this is done will 
be fully covered for all the case studies to be looked at in the research for the final report, 
due in June 2012. 
This report will evaluate not only what can be learned from analyzing business 
models for the sustainment of platforms at different phases of their lifecycle, but also how 
innovative and disruptive technologies can be incorporated into robust business models, 
such as the use of EPIC (Electric Potential Integrated Circuit) sensors for the support of 
carbon fiber and stealth materials, and at the translation of business models between 
nations. 
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